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The theory of just world belief raised by Lemer (1965) predicted that stronger 
believer in a just world is more likely to form fairer perceptions. However, previous 
research has been too focused on third parties and neglected actors. By identifying the 
differences between actors and third parties, the current study proposed that a positive 
relationship existed between people's belief in a just world and their justice 
perceptions while for actors, this relationship might become negative. We also argue 
that this relationship would be moderated by opinions from others. In addition, due to 
the cognitive capacity, we further propose that strategies for restoring justice might 
not occur at the same time. A 2 (representation: actor/third party) by 2 (belief in a just 
world: high/low) by 3 (others' opinions: fair/not fair/none) by 2 (positively-biased/ 
negatively-biased) scenario experiment was conducted on 300 students in Beijing. 
Differences were found between actors and third parties and the relationships were 
found to be influenced by others' opinions. Also, the results suggested that strategies 
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1. Introduction 
People have different understandings of the world. Some believe the world is just and 
some do not. Strong believers in a just world tend to perceive the world as just. This 
belief was called belief in a just world by Lemer (1965). Lemer 's just world theory 
proposed that people have a need to believe in a just world and encouraged people to 
see the world around them as orderly, meaningful and predictable. As predicted by the 
theory, it is found that people with a strong belief in a just world tend to perceive an 
event as fair. Recently, researchers also argued that the belief in a just world is a 
buffer against negative affect, such as anger, and good for people's psychological 
well-being, which comprise three aspects, self-acceptance, life satisfaction, and 
self-respect (Dalbert, 2002). 
According to this theory, suffering of an innocent person will pose a threat to people's 
belief in a just world (Hafer, 2000) and in order to maintain their belief, they will 
adopt different kinds of strategies to restore their unjust feelings (for a review, please 
see Hafer and Begue, 2005). The most often studied strategy is derogation. That is, 
when people see suffering of an innocent person, their belief in a just world is 
threatened, since this is contradictory to their belief that good people get good results 
and bad people get bad results. Thus, in order to maintain their belief in a just world, 
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they have to reinterpret the character or behaviors of the victim to believe that the 
victim deserves their fate and their suffering due to their undesirable character or 
wrong behaviors. In that way, people's belief in a just world can be maintained. This 
theory has received support from many of the previous studies (e.g. Correia, Vala, & 
Aguiar, 2001; Anderson, 1992; Pancer, 1988) and explained many social phenomena, 
such as people's attitudes and perceptions toward the victims of poverty, layoff, illness 
and so on. This study aims to contribute to the literature of belief in a just world by: (1) 
understanding how actors and third parties would react differently to the threat to their 
belief in a just world; (2) exploring the possibility of the co-occurrence of different 
strategies coping with the threat to people's belief in a just world; (3) analyzing the 
influence of others' opinions on people's justice perception formation. 
According to Lemer, there exists a world of victims (actors) and a world of 
nonvictims (third parties). However, one of the key assumptions of those studies is 
that people are always third parties who only belong to the world of nonvictims 
because people in those studies were always there to judge victims and they were 
never victims themselves. The question is how if the actors themselves become 
victims. Will they still react to the injustice in the same way as when they are just 
third parties? 
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Tanaka (1999) examined this concern and investigated the effects of just world belief 
on the egocentric fairness bias using a Japanese sample. Tanaka asserted that this bias 
would lead people to remember their own fair behaviors and other's unfair behaviors, 
and to attribute more fair behaviors to oneself. This bias was also reported in the USA 
and the Netherlands (Messick et al, 1985; Liebrand, et al, 1986). Based on this finding, 
we may suspect that maybe the effect of belief in a just world has different 
mechanisms for actors and third parties. However, the most recent review by Hafer 
and Begue (2005) intensely reviewed studies on belief in a just world from 1989 to 
2005 and found that surprisingly few existing studies have focused on actors. The 
present study aims to identify the differences between the perceptions of actors and 
third parties as well as its impact on the relationship between the just world belief and 
justice perceptions as well as self-acceptance using a scenario-based experiment. 
Also the study tests the influence of social information on people's justice perception 
formation, with the theoretical foundation on the heuristic theory. In particular, this 
study analyze whether people's justice perceptions will be influence by others' 
opinions. 
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In addition, although Lerner (1978) suggested totally nine strategies to cope with the 
threat to the belief in a just world, such as reinteipretation of the outcomes, the 
multiple worldview and so on, compared to the strategy of derogation which has been 
intensively studied, other strategies have not been paid much attention (Hafer & 
Begue, 2005), let alone the examination of the possibility of multiple strategies. It is 
still unknown whether people will adopt different kinds of strategies in order to cope 
with the threat to the belief in a just world and restore justice. Apart from examining 
the difference between actors and third parties in their reactions to injustice, another 
line of the current study will be on testing whether different strategies would occur at 
the same time or not. This study makes progress on the question of whether people 
use multiple strategies to restore justice or only use one strategy at one time, with a 
perspective of cognitive capacity. 
2. Theories and hypotheses 
2.1 actors and third parties 
2.1.1 Belief in a just world 
People have a need to believe in a just world and are willing to live in a world which 
is orderly, meaningful, and predictable. Lerner (1965) described this belief as the 
"belief in a just world" and proposed that people have a tendency to see a fit between 
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people's outcomes and their personal worth. That is to say, good people get good 
results and bad people get bad results. Also, people get awards proportional to their 
efforts and get punishment proportional to their fault. Generally speaking, people get 
what they deserve. 
This belief in a just world helped people confront with the outside world which is 
usually ambiguous and complex and the general justice motive of people's need to 
believe in a just world is to maintain their personal contract (Lemer, 1980). The basic 
assumption of the personal contract is that people invest time, energy and other 
resources and will finally obtain what one believes one deserves. This personal 
contract is only effective and valid if people live in a just world. Otherwise, if the 
world is not just, there is no guarantee that people's efforts will finally be paid off. 
Thus, in order to maintain this commitment, people need to belief in a just world. Any 
events in which good people cannot get good results, pose a threat to this central 
belief of people and they are motivated to reduce this threat to maintain their belief in 
a just world with different kinds of strategies. If we perceive just world belief with the 
lens of heuristics, it still makes sense to us. This belief functions as the heuristics for 
people to make sense of the external world and get more control over it. If they 
believe in a just world, they are relatively confident that their efforts will finally pay 
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back. Otherwise, it may be difficult for people to determine whether or not to invest 
efforts because they may doubt whether or not they can get what they deserve in the 
long run. 
Thus, people are not willing to give up the belief in a just world. They strive for 
consistency between their prior beliefs about the world and their interpretation of a 
specific new situation (Fiske & Taylor，1991). Also, Lemer (1980) pointed out that 
beliefs are the expression of the way a person organizes his or her perceptions and 
cognitions towards the world. With this perspective, people are consistency seekers. 
For example, if people believe the world is fair, they will interpret the situations they 
encounter as fair, rather than unfair, since this interpretation allows them to maintain 
their prior belief in a just world. Research has also shown that the need for 
consistency is a major influence on the way individuals construct the social reality. 
The application of belief in a just world has been found to be a dual process in the 
social perceptions (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). They described that both implicit and 
explicit cognitions would shape people's judgments and they termed these two 
processing systems as "experiential system" and the "rational system". The rational 
system has the properties of the conventional, logical and rational thoughts and 
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primarily operates at the conscious level. On the contrary, the experiential system 
provides a quick and dirty way to make judgments to the encounters and usually this 
system operates at the preconscious level. This system works especially when people 
are seized by their emotions. These two systems often operate in parallel and they 
often interact with each other in shaping their judgments. They thus argued that the 
effects of belief in a just world would exaggerate when people are engaged with 
strong emotions, than weak emotions. 
2.1.2 Threat to the belief in a just world 
Although people want to see a fit between their belief in a just world and the realities 
they encounter in their daily life, it is inevitable that there exist some situations that 
are obviously contradictory to people's beliefs. The innocent victim's suffering will 
pose a threat to such a belief and responses may be attempts to reduce this threat 
(Hafer, 2000). Rokeach (1971) made the assumption that the disconfirmation of a 
belief will elicit a negative state. The more central and important the belief is to 
people，the more negatively people feel. This motivates people to restore justice and 
maintain their beliefs. In the same vein, Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance holds that the inconsistencies in social thinking can create a negative and 
aversive feeling; this aversive state in turn motivates individuals to reduce the 
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inconsistency by changing one element of it or by adding one additional element. All 
in all, people will feel upset when they see suffering of innocent and their belief in a 
just world will be threatened. They will try to restore justice and maintain their belief 
in a just world. 
2.1.3 Maintenance of the belief in a just world 
The theory of just world belief argues that when people's belief in a just world is 
threatened, they have to justify the "deservingness" of victims. If they construe that 
victims deserve their suffering, especially, they merited their own fate by virtue of 
something they did or they failed to do, or they are bad or wrong in nature, this 
perfectly confirms people's just world belief and the scene of "injustice" fits people to 
their fate. People will not feel upset, frustrated, angry, outraged, or conflicting when 
they see a victim's suffering as deserved. Thus, the key to maintain people's belief in 
a just world is to deal with the issue of deservingness of victims. If people can 
successfully affirm that victims deserve their own fate, their belief in a just world will 
be maintained. 
Although nine main strategies for preserving a belief in a just world were proposed by 
Lemer (Lerner, 1980; Lemer & Miller, 1978)，previous studies have focused on the 
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strategy to derogate the victim. It is proposed that when people see suffering of an 
innocent person, while it is impossible to reward or to compensate victims, or the cost 
is too high to reward or to compensate victims, they are likely to devalue or derogate 
the victim by thinking that the suffering of the victims is due to his or her own fate 
and fault. In doing so, they maintain their belief in a just world. Generally, as raised 
by Lemer (1980), two rationales underline people's judgments of deservingness of 
others' fate: behavior and character. When confronted with injustice and suffering 
innocent, by attributing the responsibility to the victims and devaluating the characters 
of the victims can people's belief in a just world get maintained. For example, people 
are inclined to assign the responsibility to the victims themselves for their improper 
behaviors, such as victims of HIV/AIDS (e.g. Comby, Devos, & Deschamps, 1995; 
Anderson, 1992), victim of sexual assault (Gilmartin-Zena, 1983); they are also likely 
to devaluate the character of victims in order to maintain their belief in a just world, 
such as for cancer patients (Braman & Lambert, 2001; Gruman & Sloan, 1983). 
2.1.4 Current research focus and the research gap 
Of the huge amount of literature on just world belief, most of them have focused on 
the observers' belief in a just world and its consequences on how they made judgment 
on an event. As shown above, different kinds of stimuli were used in the research on 
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how people perceive others' suffering with the perspective of belief in a just world, to 
name quite a few, patients with HIV/AIDS were held responsibility for their illness 
because of their own behaviors or characters (e.g. Comby et al. 1995). Victims of 
sexual assault were considered to deserve for their own improper behaviors (e.g. 
Whatley & Riggio, 1993; Gilmartin-Zena, 1983). 
On the contrary, only a few studies have looked at how the victims would respond to 
their own fates and suffering. In a most recent review on the theory of just world 
belief, Hafer and Begue (2005) reviewed 66 experimental studies testing predictions 
derived from the just world belief that have been published since 1980. Among these 
66 studies, only 6 of them concerned self-experienced injustice as the primary 
stimulus, which accounts for less than 10% of the whole literature. 
The limited attention on victims themselves can be partially explained by the effects 
of projection. As suggested by the projection theory, people are inclined to view 
others as more similar with them than they really are (Ruben, 1988). In line of this 
theory, we speculate that since research on the just world belief began with studying 
people's justice perceptions when they were observers, it is possible for later 
researchers to expect similar effects for third parties would as well appear on actors. 
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As a result, they do not make an effort to study actors'justice perceptions. That is to 
say, when researchers project third parties to actors, they overlook the differences 
between actors and third parties, and perceive the research on third parties as enough 
for understanding both actors and third parties. However, as will be presented below, 
actors and third parties differ in several aspects, some of which are fundamental. We 
suspect that these differences are likely to result in different effects of just world 
belief on justice perceptions for actors, although there are abundant research on third 
parties ' just world belief and justice perceptions. 
2.1.5 Actors and third parties 
Although the difference between actors and third parties has not yet drawn attention 
of researchers in the field of just world theory, one of its closely related fields, justice 
research has already seen some systematical studies on the difference between actors 
and third parties. Skarlicki and Kulik (2005)'s work is worthy to be noted. This work 
may give us many useful insights into our understanding of the similar issues in the 
theory of just world belief. 
Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) systematically defined the term third parties and explicitly 
pointed out some differences between actors and third parties as well as the effects on 
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the justice perception formation. The term "third party" is to describe individuals who 
form impressions of organizational justice often based upon an indirect and vicarious 
experience of an organizational event. That is to say, people who are aware of but not 
directly involved in a justice event are called third parties, or observers. Those who 
are directly engaged in an unjust event are called actors, or victims. 
There are various kinds of third parties, including coworkers, friends, family members, 
customers, investors, judges, members of the general public, and the media and so on. 
Some third parties may have direct contact with the actors, such as friends, family 
members, coworkers and so on. Some others may not be able to have direct contact 
with the actors, such as the bystanders and similar strangers. The latter group of third 
parties is selected as the research target of this study. The reasons why this research 
focuses on the strangers are as follows: first of all, although some third parties may be 
acquaintances to the actors, most other third parties are strangers, who do not know 
the actors. And the strangers are representative of most third parties. Second, the use 
of strangers as the target of this study matches our research questions that how people 
would react to injustice if they cannot or are not able to help or compensate the 
victims. Third, using the extreme cases maximizes the experimental effect. Stranger is 
of one extreme of the third parties, and by choosing them as our targets can best 
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display the effect. Thus, based on these considerations, we choose strangers are the 
representativeness of third parties in this study. 
Generally, there are the following differences between actors and third parties that 
pose some influence on people's perception formation. Firstly, as Raven and Rubin 
(1976) explained, the salience of the same information may be different for actors and 
the observers. Specifically, when a subject acts as the actor, the situation is 
particularly salient for him or her and the subject will give more emphasis to the 
situation and see how to respond to it. On the contrary, when taking the representation 
of third parties, the subject can see the whole picture and are more likely to give 
weight to the actor's responsibility. Also as described by the fundamental attribution 
error, people tend to attribute their success to their dispositional attributes but attribute 
their failure to the environmental causal contenders (Ross, 1977). While the victims 
are likely to attribute the responsibility to others, third parties are more likely to avoid 
taking the responsibility to the victims. Moreover, informational differences also 
influence the attribution of responsibility of an event. As suggested by Jones and 
Nisbett (1972), actors have a wealth of information that they will behave in different 
ways in different contexts, so that they are inclined to attribute their failure to the 
environment/external factors. On the other hand, observers only have the information 
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of a certain actor's behavior in one context or in several limited contexts, so they tend 
to assume actors' behaviors as driven by actors' own dispositions. 
Secondly, Raven and Rubin (1976) pointed out another reason why third parties differ 
from actors is the self-serving bias. People all want to maintain our positive 
self-image especially when we act badly and avoid doing things that may do harm to 
our self-image. Thus, when confronted with a bad event, actors want to maintain their 
good image and would prefer not to take the responsibility and be blamed. But it is 
not the case for third parties. Consistent with this argument on motivation, Skalicki 
and Kulik (2005) also argued that third parties are more likely than actors to make the 
justice perceptions with the motive of social morals. Although it is very difficult to 
assert that third parties are totally without any self-interest motivation or identification 
concern when making justice perceptions (Leung, Chiu, & Au, 1993), their motivation 
can also be explained by social moral requirement and moral assumptions (Folger, 
2001). For example, Turillo et al. (2002) found that third parties are willing to make 
the self-sacrificed decision just for the sake of justice, neither for self-interest nor for 
self-identification. Moral obligations are perceived as the end themselves rather than a 
means to struggle instrumentally for private purposes. Thus, they are more likely to 
attribute the responsibility to the actors. 
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This argument is also consistent with the study on self involvement (Kunda, 1990). 
Self involvement is determined jointly by both personal relevance and importance, 
which will usually influences the amount of processing and it direction. In particular, 
actors are directly involved in the event and thus the event is of high personal 
relevance and importance to actors. They will intensely process the information and 
their perceptions can be biased. It can also be illustrated by the fact mentioned above, 
that people prefer to search for and attend to information that is consistent with their 
prior belief and which does not pose threat to their own self-image (Festinger, 1957). 
Thirdly, third parties' information is usually obtained second-handedly while actors 
naturally get first-hand information by directly involving in the event. Skalicki and 
Kulik (2005) argued that although actors' justice judgment is perceptually derived, 
third parties ' justice perceptions are usually influenced by other third parties, such as 
the interpretation of other people, the reports of the media. Thus, third parties' fairness 
perceptions involve "perceptions of perceptions," and their judgments can be more 
susceptible than actors ' judgment to others' opinions (DeGoey, 2000). Also because 
actors and third parties differ in degrees of involvement of an event, they may have 
different experience of the justice event. Since third parties are not directly involved 
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in the justice event, their experience of the event is usually less intense, compared 
with victims (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). However, there are also few 
exceptions in which third parties feel more intense than actors. For example, Crosby 
(1984) found that third parties felt more intense than the working women who were 
direct victims in the sex discrimination event in an organization. Thus, studies 
mentioned above argued that third parties make their justice perceptions in a different 
way from actors and the difference will exert influence on the judgment-related 
issues. 
2.1.6 Hypothesis development 
The findings mentioned above suggest that when third parties witness or come to 
know an unfair event, they can do very little to compensate or to "save" the victims 
and punish the transgressors. That is to say, if third parties strongly believe in a just 
world and witness an unjust event, their belief in a just world is threatened. This 
would lead people to feel frustrated, angry, or upset and drive people to restore justice. 
As third parties, they usually can do nothing to compensate the victims, since they are 
just strangers, not the arbitrators or the likes. Thus, the first way, to save and 
compensate victims, is not available and cannot work. Thus, in order to maintain their 
belief in a just world, they are more likely to attribute more responsibility of the 
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negative outcome to the victims and match the suffering with victims' own 
responsibility. By so doing, they are more likely to perceive the justice event fairer 
and believe that victims are getting what they deserve. For example, when they hear 
from the media a victim of robbery, they usually can do nothing to compensate the 
victim because they do not even know the victim. But it is easy for them to construe 
the fact in a different way. That is, that victim may have shown off his or her richness 
in public and attracted the attention of gangsters. Their own improper behaviors led to 
the robbery. By thinking that victims deserve their own fate and suffering, people's 
belief in a just world maintains. The world is still a just place. 
This argument is shown to be true by some studies with diverse populations so that 
this effect for third parties is relatively robust (e.g. Simons & PUavin’ 1972). For 
example, strong believers in a just world displayed a "cold-blood" attitude toward 
people in suffering, such as the AIDS carriers, and the poor people (Fumham & 
Gunter, 1984; Connors & Heaven, 1990), because they tend to believe that the AID 
patients and poor people suffer what they deserve. In sum, previous research has 
suggested that there was a more negative evaluation of the victim (secondary 
victimization) especially when BJW was stronger. It was also found that when people 
believe that the suffering of victims is going to be persistent and last for long, there 
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are more likely to derogate the victims (Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2001; Hafer & Begue, 
2005). 
From another angle of perspective, the fundamental attributional error can also 
explain this relationship well. As we mentioned above, due to the fundamental 
attributional error (Ross, 1977)，people have a tendency to make dispositional 
attributions for others' behaviors, even when there are clear external/environmental 
causal contenders. On the contrary, when making their own attributions, people are 
more likely to attribute their success to their own dispositions and efforts and attribute 
their failure to the external/environmental factors. Combining with the just world 
research above, when third parties strongly believe in a just world, they are more 
likely to believe that people get what they deserve and they are more likely to attribute 
the fault to the victim's own dispositional features. Thus, they are more likely to think 
that victims in question are receiving what he or she deserves and that the event is less 
unfair. 
When it comes to actors, situations become different. When third parties' belief in a 
just world is threatened, they can maintain their belief by devaluing and derogating 
victims. However, when actors believe in a just world and experience unjust treatment, 
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they are less likely to blame themselves for their suffering because people have a need 
to maintain their positive self-image and they will avoid damaging their self-image 
(Shaver, 1970; Shaw & McMartin, 1977). Thus, if they strongly believe in a just 
world, they are more likely to believe that they should get what they deserve and 
should not get suffering because of others' fault rather than their own. Consistent with 
the predictions by the fundamental attribution error that they are more likely to 
attribute the negative outcomes to the external/environmental factors, they are more 
likely to attribute the responsibility to other parties and other external factors. 
The egocentric fairness bias (Tanaka, 1999) also made arguments in the same way. 
Three main consequences of this egocentric fairness bias are: first, one tends to 
remember one's own fair behaviors and others' unfair behaviors; second, one 
attributes more fair behaviors to oneself and more unfair behaviors to other people; 
third, one perceives that one's own behaviors are never unfair, that the behaviors of 
others are never fair, and that unfair behaviors of oneself and fair behaviors of others 
do not occur. And this bias is found to be strengthened by the strong just world 
believers (Tanaka, 1999). 
In the present study, we argue that if victims have a strong belief in a just world and 
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experience unjust treatment, they are going to adopt some strategies to restore justice 
in order to maintain their belief in a just world. The negative emotions caused by the 
justice event push them to find someone to b lame~ei ther the harm doer, or the victim. 
Unlike third parties, who can freely choose to blame for the victims, the victims 
themselves are not likely to choose the strategy of blaming themselves or derogating 
themselves, which are totally contradicting with people's desire to avoid damaging 
their positive self-image. Thus, according to the egocentric fairness bias we 
mentioned above, they are more likely to believe that other's behaviors are not fair 
and the external, rather than the internal, factors should be responsible for their 
suffering. And the stronger their beliefs are, the more threat to their belief in a just 
world they will experience and the needier for them to find others to take the 
responsibility of their own suffering. With such reasoning, they will attribute more 
responsibility to other parties. Thus, they may react more negatively to the justice 
perceptions. 
This study will focus on discussing procedural justice and interactional justice, rather 
than distributive justice. The reasons are two-folded. For one, when the concept of 
just world belief was raised in 1960s, the other two aspects of justice, procedural 
justice and interactional justice have not been raised; therefore, overwhelmingly more 
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attention in just world theory has been paid to distributive justice and less to 
procedural justice and interactional justice. Second, as predicted by procedural justice 
and interactional justice, justice and injustice are not simply from the evaluations on 
the outcomes, on the contrast, the procedures and interactional treatment are also very 
critical in people 's justice perception formation. Building on these considerations, I 
would like to explore the two justice perceptions, procedural justice and interactional 
justice, in the current study and propose that: 
H I : For third parties，belief in a just world is positively related to their perceived 
justice perceptions; for actors, belief in a just world is negatively related to their 
perceived justice perceptions. 
2.2. Heuristic cues 
As we stated above, third parties differ f rom actors in several aspects, one of which is 
the information differences. Usually, third parties do not have enough information to 
evaluate the event and form justice perceptions. For example, they may just know the 
general situation of an event, like a company cuts the salary of employees, and they 
may not be able to know exactly the ratio of the employee's input and output to infer 
the distributive justice, or how the company made the decision to infer the procedural 
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justice, or whether the company offers explanations to the employees to infer the 
interactional justice. 
According to the heuristic theory, the heuristic formation is most likely to form when 
individuals are faced with ambiguity about the situation. Simply speaking, heuristics 
are cognitive short-cuts, with which people can make decisions or form perceptions in 
complex situations. And these heuristic cues will anchor the interpretation of 
subsequent information, which is typically biased towards the direction of the 
heuristic cues. For example, when we do not know information on the distributive 
justice but have information on procedural justice, the information on the procedures 
become our heuristic cues with which we can form our distributive justice perceptions. 
That is to say, when people perceive the procedures to be fair, they are more likely to 
perceive the outcomes as fair; on the contrary, when they perceive the procedures to 
be unfair, they are more likely to perceive the outcomes to be unfair. Based on the 
heuristic theory, we believe that when third parties make the judgment in the 
ambiguous situation, they are more likely to be influenced by the heuristic 
information and their judgment will be biased towards such heuristic information. 
Others' opinion, as one of the most commonly encountered information sources, is the 
focus of the current research. 
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The notion that people's justice perceptions are influenced by other people's opinions 
is well documented in DeGoey (2000)，s research. In his study, he used the social 
contagion concept to investigate the process of how people arrive at a general 
consensus in their justice perceptions towards a justice event. Two mechanisms were 
suggested: cognitive and emotional, which means that people are likely to be 
influence by others' opinions by thinking in the way others think (cognitive), and 
feeling in the way others feel (emotional). Sometimes, people are forced to comply 
with others' opinions to avoid social pressure and sometimes they are induced to agree 
with others. No matter which mechanism they undergo, their justice perceptions are 
suggested to be influenced by others' opinions. And we argue that: 
H2: people's belief in a just world will be influenced by others' opinions on people's 
perceived fairness perceptions (2a); people's perceived justice perceptions will be 
higher (lower) when they know other people think it is fair (not fair) (2b). 
2.3 Multiple strategies 
2.3.1 Co-occurrence of strategies 
Nine strategies were raised by Lemer (1980) to restore people's belief in a just world: 
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two rational strategies (preventing and compensation), four nonrational strategies 
(denial-withdrawal, reinterpretation of the cause, reinteipretation of character, and 
reinterpretation of the outcome), two protective strategies (ultimate justice, and 
multiple worldview) and one penultimate defense. Although later studies raised other 
strategies, they are similar to or just some extremes of some of these nine strategies. 
For instance, a related potential strategy that has been directly investigated is termed 
psychological distancing, in which targets of injustice are seen as unlike oneself so 
that such suffering will never befall to the subjects themselves. A closer look at this 
statement reveals that this strategy is nearly the same with the strategy "multiple 
worldview" which holds that people who are suffering belong to another world which 
is different from one's own just world. This allows people to cope with the threats to 
their needs to believe in a just world and believe that such suffering will never happen 
in their just world. 
Although these strategies are seemingly diversified, they can be classified into two 
grand types: cognitive and behavioral. Cognitive strategies include denial-withdrawal, 
reinterpretation of the cause, reinteipretation of character, and reinterpretation of the 
outcome, ultimate justice, multiple worldview, and penultimate defense. Behavioral 
strategies include prevention, compensation, and denial-withdrawal. 
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Denial-withdrawal belongs to cognitive type and behavioral type, because it includes 
both the physical and mental avoidance of injustice in the first place as well as 
withdrawing both physically and psychologically from threats to the need to believe 
in a just world when they are encountered with unjust events. People can choose 
either one of them to meet their need to maintain their belief in a just world and 
restore justice. 
Previous research, however, has over-emphasized the strategies of victim blame and 
victim character devaluation, and other possible strategies are overlooked. This study 
is also aimed to fill in this research gap and dedicated to explore the possibility of the 
occurrence of different strategies, with a perspective of the limitation of cognitive 
capability. 
Though not many studies have paid attention to the examination of the issue of 
co-occurrence of strategies, several experiments investigating other strategies still 
deepened our understanding of these mechanisms with which people restore their 
justice perceptions and accumulated precious knowledge for us to build on. For 
example, Pancer's (1988) experiment explored the strategy of avoidance of victims by 
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measuring the distance subjects kept from a desk that displayed a sign with an appeal 
to help a needy child. This study confirmed that avoidance may be one way of 
responding to the threat an innocent victim poses to one's need to believe in a just 
world. 
Now that only a few studies have gone beyond the typically investigated victim blame 
and victim character devaluation strategies, even less studies included more than one 
strategy in their research at the same time. According to Lemer and Simmons (1966)'s 
study, they conceived that the devaluation of the victim and the blaming of the victim 
as alternative strategies, which also meant that these strategies tend to be mutually 
exclusive, rather than cumulative. Except for this pioneering study, the issue of the 
possibility of co-occurrence is nearly untouched until three recent studies, according 
to Hafer and Begue (2005)'s study. These three studies have made different arguments 
and found dissimilar results. 
Reichle, Schneider, and Montada (1998) found a strong positive correlation between 
two of the strategies, which are minimization of the victims' injustice and blaming of 
the victim. Another study by Correia, Vala, and Aguiar (1998) also echoed this finding 
and found several correlations among their measures of subjects' reactions to victims, 
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including relations between less perceived suffering and more avoidance, more blame, 
and less positive character assessment, as well as associations between greater blame 
and less positive character assessment, suggesting that people would try all means to 
restore justice. It seems that certain strategies to maintain people's belief in a just 
world might co-occur. However, their findings should be interpreted with caution 
since they failed to find support for the predicted interaction effects. 
To our best knowledge, the most recent study addressing strategy co-occurrence and 
predictors of different strategies from a system justification theory point of view is 
from Kay, Jost, and Young (2005). They proposed that victim derogation and victim 
enhancement are alternate routes to system justification. Specifically, whether people 
derogate or enhance the character of the victims varies as a function of trait causality. 
A manipulation designed to increase the strength of the system-justification motive 
led people to increasingly derogate losers and lionize winners on causally relevant 
dimensions, and at the same time, to increasingly elevate losers and downgrade 
winners on causally irrelevant dimension. This research suggested that these strategies 
are not mutually exclusive but rather compatible, functionally equivalent routes to 
system justification. 
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However, there is also a study which argued in a different way from the studies above. 
Although not directly proposed in their study, Skarlicki, El lard, and Kelln (1998) 
found that victim derogation was negatively related to observers' retributive intentions 
as customers, led them to suggest that when posed with a threat to their just world 
beliefs, third parties were motivated to restore justice either with cognitive or 
behavioral strategies. This interesting finding, consistent with the assumption by 
Lemer and Simmons (1966), again draws our attention to this counterintuitive 
suggestion, since according to our common sense, people will do anything they can, 
adopt as more strategies as they can, to cope with problems they encounter. However, 
the results of this study suggested that people do not waste any "resource" they have 
and they only reacted to injustice either cognitively or behaviorally. Despite this 
interesting finding, Skarlicki et al (1998) did not go further to offer any explanations 
on that. 
Although not intended to explain the controversial findings mentioned above, the 
arguments of several studies may shed light on our understanding on this issue. For 
instance, Hafer and Begue (2005), in their recent review, admitted that dealing with 
the threats to people's belief in a just world may need more or less cognitive distortion. 
Some strategies may require less cognitive distortion than others. For example, the 
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balancing strategy may be a more common way of reinterpreting unjust events than 
minimization since it requires less cognitive distortion overall. 
CoiTcia, Vala, and Aguiar (2001) also pointed out that the basis for the just-world 
theory is that there is a motivation to reorganize cognitions every time there is a 
discrepancy between the characteristics or the actions of someone and the outcome 
he/she gets when it is not apparently possible to eliminate the injustice of the situation. 
Kay, Jost, and Young (2005) suggested that people are motivated to justify existing 
social arrangements or the injustice they encountered, then it followed that they may 
selectively employ different "strategies" to attain this goal, depending on which 
strategy seems most appropriate or effective under the circumstances. 
Each of "distortion, reorganization, or justification" mentioned above has led us to 
realize the fact that when people are trying to cope with something threatening they 
will involve some cognitive work, more or less. Also, "the reason we selectively 
attend to some cues is often attributed to inadequate channel capacity or to our 
inability to process all sensory cues simultaneously" (Solso, 1988: 89). Combining 
these two lines of thinking together, it is reasonable to speculate that due to the 
inadequacy of cognitive channel capacity, people will minimize their means to restore 
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justice when their belief in a just world is threatened. That is to say, they will use the 
least strategy, sole strategy to restore justice, as long as it works, rather than multiple 
strategies. Two strategies of interest in the current study are: reinteipretation of 
character and reinterpretation of outcomes. 
The reinterpretation of character, in this study, refers to subjects' acceptance of 
themselves, that is, how people evaluate their character and accept themselves, after 
undergoing an unjust event themselves, or knowing an unjust event as a third party. 
Specifically, if people experience injustice and could not find any flaws of other 
people or parties, they would have no choice but to attribute the responsibility to 
themselves which makes them harder to accept themselves. In this way, they got bad 
results because they made mistakes, which is what has been predicted by the just 
world theory and this belief can be maintained. In the same vein, if people, as third 
parties, are aware of an unjust event, but are not able to do things to help victims out, 
they are more likely to blame themselves for being unable to help the victims. 
The reinterpretation of outcomes, in this study, refers to the reevaluation of the 
justness of the event in question. Specifically, if people's belief in a just world is 
threatened by the encounter of innocent people's suffering, people may restore justice 
- 3 6 -
and maintain their belief in a just world by thinking that the results are less unfair. By 
thinking so, the threat of innocent people's suffering will be reduced. These two 
strategies are of interest in the current study. Combining the argument above and 
based on the limitation of the cognitive capacity, we propose that: 
H3: people's strategies to maintain their belief in a just world are exclusive, rather 
than cumulative. Specifically, the reinterpretation of the outcome and the 
reinterpretation of character will not occur at the same time. 
3. Method 
3.1 Research design 
This study is a 2 (representation: actors; third parties) * 3 (opinion: fair; not fair; no 
opinion given) * 2 (bias: advantage situation; disadvantage situation) * 2 (BJW: high ； 
low) factorial scenario experiment. Representation was manipulated by whether they 
were asked to take the representation as actors or third parties. Opinion was 
manipulated by telling them their friends considered the event as fair, not fair, or they 
were given no opinions of others. Bias was manipulated by whether the focal person 
was advantage situation or disadvantage situation, which specifically referred to 
whether that person got higher or lower salary than a comparable person. Belief in a 
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just world will be measured directly and median-split into groups of high BJW and 
low BJW. This study aimed to test the interactive effects of these four variables on the 
outcome variable of procedural justice, interactional justice and self-acceptance. 
The first three variables were manipulated using information embedded in scenario 
that described a justice event which concerned with the salary appraisal in one 
company. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 12 scenarios (2 
representation conditions * 3 opinion conditions * 2 bias conditions) and were asked 
to answer questions after reading the assigned scenario. 
Table 1 research design 
actors third parties 
fair unfair no opinion fair unfair no opinion 
advantage situation 1 2 3 7 8 9 
disadvantage situation 4 5 6 10 11 12 
3.2 Scenarios 
The subjects responded to a questionnaire written in Chinese. One of the 12 scenarios 
(see Appendix) was presented at the beginning of the questionnaire. The following 
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scenario is for the condition in which subjects were asked to take the representation as 
actors and assume they got less salary than a comparable person. Also, they were 
given the information that their friend thought this was fair. The bracketed 
explanations are details of other manipulations in other scenarios. 
Suppose you are now hired by a company and begin to work there (suppose you are a 
fresh graduate and are now finding a job. Here is some practice of a company you 
heard from others). A salary appraisal system is adopted in this company. For each 
new employee, the human resource management department (HRM) gives him or her 
one final overall score by appraising the employee's CV and interview and set the 
salary according to that overall score. The higher the score, the higher the salary. 
There are five levels of the salary in the company with 1st level the lowest and 
level the highest. The difference of the nearing two levels means several hundred 
RMB, which is not a small amount for a fresh graduate in mainland. Since you (new 
employees) just enter this company, you (they) have no idea of how this system works 
or have the opportunity to raise some suggestions. The HRM department have not 
asked for employees' opinions on this either. Explanations are not clearly given. After 
you (an employee) enter(s) that company, you (he or she) are (is) given a level 
salary while another new employee, whose qualifications are almost the same as you 
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(him or her), is given 4山 level salary. One of your friends think that this is fair and 
says: "although there is a big difference in salary, each company has their own 
practices in appraising the salary. It is quite common that you (she or he) have (has) 
not received the same salary." (This last phrase was replaced by: one of your friends 
think that this is unfair and says: "under the same appraisal system, the salary is so 
different from others while you (she and he) share similar qualifications. That does 
not make sense at a l l .") 
3.3 Pilot study 
Pilot study was conducted before the survey. Twenty nine students in the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong completed the questionnaires for the pilot study. Since it is a 
pilot study and the sample size is very small, only 4 out of 12 scenarios were tested. 
These were scenario 1，4, 7, 10, which were mainly concerned with the actor/third 
parties manipulation. 
3.3.1 Measurements 
After reading the scenario, the subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire 
beginning with several questions about the objective facts of the scenario. These 
questions are aimed to check whether the subjects paid attention to the information we 
- 4 0 -
hope them to. Also, by asking these questions before other scales can remind the 
subjects of some facts of the scenario and strengthen the experimental effects. 
Following these questions are several scales measuring procedural justice, 
interactional justice, belief in a just world, projective measures, and several 
demographics. 
Manipulation checks: a) in this scenario, you are the employee of this company; b) 
in this scenario, your salary is higher than the comparable other; c) my friend's 
opinion toward this event is that it is fair (not applicable to scenario 3’ 6, 9, 12). 
Procedural justice (PJ): Niehoff and Moorman (1993)'s 6-item scale ( a >.90) was 
adopted in the current study (seven-point ratings; a higher score indicated a stronger 
procedural justice). Example items include "the decision of the salary appraisal is 
made in an unbiased manner", "all employees' concerns are made sure to be heard 
before decisions are made", etc. 
Interactional justice (IJ): Niehoff and Moorman (1993)'s 9-item scale ( a >.90) was 
adopted in the current study (seven-point ratings; a higher score indicated a stronger 
interactional justice). Example items include "when decisions are made about the 
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salary, the department treats the employees with kindness and considerations", "the 
department explains very clearly any decision made about the salary", etc. 
Belief in a just world (BJW): Dalbert (2002)'s 6-item scale was used to examine the 
degree of belief in a just world (seven-point ratings; a higher score indicated a 
stronger belief in a just world). Example items include "I am confident that justice 
always prevails over injustice", "I believe that, by and large, people get what they 
deserve", etc. 
Self-acceptance: Seven items from Ruderman, Ohlott, Panzer and King (2002)'s 
scale were used to examine the degree of self-acceptance (seven-point ratings; a 
higher score indicated a higher degree of self-acceptance). Examples include "it is 
hard for me to find anything to talk about when I meet a new person", etc. 
Since justice issue is sensitive to social desirability, projective measures of 
procedural justice and interactional justice were included to test whether the results 
obtained with the direct measures were subject to the influence of the bias of social 
desirability. The projective measures were obtained by making some modifications to 
the direct measures and by asking the subject how they feel others would consider the 
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justness of the event. The usage of projective measures can also capture some 
common method variance. For example, one of the projective items reads "I think 
other people may consider that the salary level is set under fair procedures" for the 
item "I think the salary level is set under fair procedures". 
Demographics: gender, age, education level are included as demographical 
variables. 
3.3.2 Description of the sample 
Of the 29 students, 65.2% of them are male and 34.8% are female. 48.3% of them 
were aged 21 to 24 and 51.7% were 25 or above. 6.9% of them are undergraduates, 
41.4% are Master students and 51.7% are doctoral students. All in all, 15 subjects 
completed the scenarios for actors and 14 subjects completed the scenarios for third 
parties. 
3.3.3 Analysis 
Two analyses were conducted on the data collected: scale reliability, ANOVA. SPSS 
software 11.5 was used. 
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Manipulation check 
The manipulation checks showed that the manipulation of representation and bias 
worked for the subjects. For the variable representation, the mean difference is 
significant [F(l,27)=181.552, MsrcPl.O?’ Mactors=2.00, pc.OOl]. For the variable bias, 
the mean difference is significant [F(l,27)=10.976, Mpositiveiy=3.67, Mnegativeiy=2.36, 
pc.Ol] . However, the manipulation for the opinion did not work well. For the variable 
opinion, F ( l , 27)=2.437, Mnot fair=2.54, Mfai,=2)25,p>A. 
Scale reliability 
Key variables in the current study have got satisfactory reliabilities: procedural justice 
(.76), interactional justice (.89), belief in a just world (.79), expect for self-acceptance 
(.3356). 
ANOVA 
By comparing the scores between the original measures and the projective measures, 
we can gain the knowledge whether subjects are influenced by the social desirability 
or not. ANOVA shows significant difference between the scores of justice measures 
and the scores of the projective measures, indicating that in the current study, subjects 
are not influenced by the social desirability. 
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3.3.4 Adjustments 
We discussed with students participating in this pilot study after they completed the 
questionnaires. Some of them said the information available is not quite enough for 
rating the interactional justice. In addition, the information in the scenario limits 
inferences. Thus, in the later version of formal survey, a general item of interactional 
justice is added in the questionnaire, so that we can capture general perceptions of the 
subjects on the interactional justice. 
Results showed that the manipulation for opinion does not work. That may be because 
the pilot study used a four-point scale which might have scattered subjects' ratings. 
This speculation was supported by talking with the subjects afterwards. Thus, yes-no 
questions were used so that subjects' ratings would be more focused and the 
experimental effects would be maximized. 
3.4 Power analysis 
Cohen (1992) pointed out there was continued neglect of statistical power analysis in 
research in the behavioral sciences and called for researchers' attention to the 
importance of the statistical power. In response to this call, in order to achieve 
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satisfactory power, necessary sample size in the current research was estimated using 
power analysis before the survey, with the indices suggested by Cohen (1992). 
Table 2 power analysis 
significance 
power effect size groups/predictors sample size 
level 
0.1 1692 
ANOVA 0.8 0.05 0.25 12 288 
0.4 120 
The sample sizes necessary for .80 power to detect effects at small, medium, and large 
effect levels, are tabled for eight standard statistical tests in Cohen (1992)'s paper. 
ANOVA will be adopted in the current study. Using the software GPOWER, the 
necessary sample sizes were computed. As showed on the table above, for ANOVA, in 
order to achieve .80 power and .05 significance level, for 12 groups in the current 
study, the sample sizes necessary are 1692, 288, 120 at effect size levels .1, .25, .4, 
respectively. Although the sample size 1692 is difficult to operate, the sample size of 
288 has already been able to detect medium effect size in ANOVA and obtain .80 
power. Totally 300 subjects are recruited in the current study and that will enable this 
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study to achieve satisfactory power. 
3.5 Main study 
A total of 300 university students (25 subjects for each cell) from a major university in 
Beijing participated in the current study. Three research coordinators help conducted 
this study in two days. On the first day, the research coordinators went to each 
classroom of a teaching building and approached students studying there. Students 
willing to take part in the survey filled out a questionnaire and they received five 
RMB for their participation upon their return of the completed questionnaire. In the 
whole process, the research coordinators stayed in the classroom to distribute and 
collect the questionnaires. A total of 252 questionnaires were completed for the first 
day. On the second day, research coordinators went to another teaching building and 
48 more questionnaires were completed and collected. In order to avoid repeating, 
students were asked not to answer the questionnaire if they had already completed one 
on the first day. Thus, totally 300 questionnaires were collected. 
The use of student sample offers various advantages in this experimental study in 
which the primary goal is theory testing. Many extraneous variables can be controlled 
because students are more homogenous as a group than ordinary individuals. In 
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addition, students can understand the scenario which told a situation of fresh graduate 
who entered a company, since students are going to face such similar situations sooner 
or later. Their reactions to the event are meaningful to the study. The research 
coordinators randomly picked 13 classrooms to ask students, who were also supposed 
to have randomly chosen that classroom to study, to fill the questionnaires. Thus, the 
subjects could be assumed to be randomly approached. 
3.6 results 
The five dependent measures [procedural justice, procedural justice (general), 
interactional justice, interactional justice (general), self-acceptance] were analyzed as 
a function of the four experimental variables (representation, opinion, bias, BJW). 
ANOVA is adopted to test the hypotheses. A summary of the ANOVA results are 
presented in Table 3. 
Manipulation checks 
The manipulation checks showed that the manipulation of representation, opinion and 
bias all worked for the subjects. For the variable representation, the mean difference is 
significant (M3rd=l.ll, Mactors=l-93, p<.001). For the variable opinion, Mnotfair=l-03, 
M""r=1.87，Afno opinion二3, f <.001. For the variable bias, Mpositive=1.05, Mnegative=1.92, 
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p <.001. For the variable BJW, it was median split into two groups using SPSS, high 
BJW (N二 164’ M二4.70) and low BJW (N=135, M二3.22), with significant difference {p 
<.001). 
Test of social desirability 
In order to test the social desirability, the justice measures were compared with their 
projective measures, respectively. Results showed that justice measures are 
significantly different from the projective measures (Mpj二3.17，Mpropj=4.46,;?<.001; 
M i j = 2 . 8 6 , Mpropj=4.05, pc.OOl). If the subjects do not think in the same way as 
ordinary others do even when they know how ordinary others consider the current 
issue, it indicates that subjects did respond in a way they expected an ordinary person 
would respond. 
Table 3 Results of analysis of variance 
F value 
self-
model/source df l df2 PJ IJ IJGEN 
acceptance 
Main effects 
Representation 1 298 0.082 0.243 1.184 2.751* 
- 4 9 -
Opinion 2 297 0.082 0.338 0.352 1.41 
Dis/advantage situation (dis/ad) 1 298 0.003 0.035 0 0.001 
BJW 1 298 4.091** 2.626 2.914** 0.765 
Two-way interaction 
representation*opinion 2 297 0.154 0.092 1.045 1.463 
representation* dis/ad 1 298 0.45 0.924 1.158 0.002 
representation*BJW 1 298 3.29* 1.238 4.712** 4.907** 
opinion* dis/ad 2 297 0.705 0.241 0.413 0.01 
opinion*BJW 2 297 1.278 1.42 7.08*** 1.506 




The results showed that the belief in a just world has main effects on procedural 
justice [F(1,298)=4.091,/7<.05] and interactional justice (general) [F(l,298)=2.914, 
p<.05]. People with strong belief in a just world (BJW) perceived higher procedural 
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justice than people with weak belief in a just world (Mhigh BJW=3.21, Miow BJW=3.14) 
and general interactional justice (Mhigh BJW=2.99, Miow BJW=2.57). Subjects reported 
similar levels of procedural justice regardless of the representation [Maaors二3.21 vs. 
M t h i r d p a r t i e s = 3 . 1 4 ； 1 , 2 9 8 ) = . 0 8 2 , T I S ]， O p i n i o n [ M n o t f a i r = 3 . 2 2 v s . M f a i r = 3 . 1 2 v s . M n o 
o p i n i o n = 3 . 1 8 ； F(l ,298)=.082, n s ]，or b i a s [ M p o s i t i v e l y = 3 . 2 0 vs. M n e g a t i v e l y = 3 . 1 5 ; 
F(l ,298)=.003, ns]. Subjects also reported similar levels of interactional justice 
(general) regardless of the representation [ M a c t o r s = 2 . 9 9 vs. Mthird p a r t i e s二 2 . 5 7 ; 
1 , 2 9 8 ) = 1 . 1 8 4 , n s ] , O p i n i o n [ M n o t f a i r = 2 . 8 5 v s . M f a i r = 2 . 6 1 v s . M n o o p i n i o n = 2 . 8 4 ； 
F(1,298)=.352, ns] , or b i a s [ M p o s i t i v e i y = 2 . 8 3 vs. M n e g a i i v e i y = 2 . 7 1 ; F(l ,298)=.000, ns]. In 
other words, whether the subjects are assumed to be actors or third parties, got 
different opinions, in positively or disadvantage situation situations, they would feel 
similar levels of procedural justice and interactional justice (general). Thus hypothesis 
1, that actors should be negatively related to BJW and third parties positively related 
to BJW, is not supported. 
In addition, although not hypothesized, representation has been found to have main 
effect on self-acceptance [F( 1,298)=2.751, p<. 1 ]. Subjects rated higher in 
self-acceptance when they are actors than they are third parties (Mactors=3.78, Mthird 
p a r t i e s — 3 . 5 9 ) . 
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Two-way interaction 
It is found that the interactive effect of representation and BJW is significant for both 
procedural justice [F( l , 298)=3.290, p < . l ] and general interactional justice [F( l , 
298)=4.712, p<.05]. The graphical representations of these two interactions are 
provided in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. 
i r ^ ^ r n 
I • 3.13 
I 2.97 o 
I 
high BJW low BJW 
— a c t o r s third parties 
Figure 1. Two-way interaction between BJW and representation, for procedural justice. 
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high BJW low BJW 
actors third parties 
Figure 2. Two-way interaction between BJW and representation, for interactional justice (general). 
Simple main effect analyses were conducted. For procedural justice, BJW only 
interacts with representation at the level of actors [Mhigh BJW=3.44 vs. Miow BJW=2.97; 
F ( l , 298)=8.098，p<.01], and no interactive effect was found at the level of third 
parties [Mhigh BJW=3. 15 vs. Miow BJW=3.13; F{i, 298)=.018, ns]. Similar result was also 
found for the outcome variable interactional justice (general): BJW only interacts with 
representation at the level of actors [Mhigh bjw=3.52 vs. Miow bjw=2.41; F(1, 
298)=7.970, pc.Ol], and no interactive effect was found at the level of third parties 
[Mhigh BJW二2.56 vs. Miow BJW二2.58; F ( l , 298)=.002, ns]. That means only actors' belief 
in a just world matters when subjects made evaluation on procedural justice and 
interactional justice (general); the higher their belief in a just world, the higher their 
procedural justice and interactional justice (general). The difference disappeared when 
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the subjects assumed that they were third parties, rather than actors. 
Significant interactive effects of opinion and BJW were also found for interactional 
justice (general). Simple main effect analysis showed that BJW interacts with all three 
levels of opinion: not fair [Mhigh BJW=3.45 VS. Miow BJW=2.09; F(1, 297)=8.864, 
fair [Mhigh BJW=3.08 VS. Miow BJW=2.03; F(1, 297)=4.840, and no opinion [Mhigh 
bjw=2.43 vs. MicnvBJw=3.40; F ( l , 297)=4.217, p<.05]. It supports that the relationship 
between BJW and interactional justice will be moderated by others' opinions. Thus, 
hypothesis 2, which predicted that the relationship between opinions and BJW would 
be moderated by others' opinions, was partially supported. However, the prediction 
that people's justice perceptions will be biased towards others' opinions was not 
supported. As presented in the Figure 3, people felt higher interactional justice 
(general) when they got the "not fair" opinion than the "fair" opinion. In addition, 
when no others' opinion was given, people with high BJW rated lower interactional 
justice (general) than people with low BJW. 
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Figure 3. Two-way interaction between BJW and opinion, for interactional justice (general). 
Another two-way interaction was found for the effects of representation and BJW on 
self-acceptance [F( l , 298)=4.907, p<.05]. The graphical representation of this 
interaction is provided in Figure 4. 
Simple main effect analyses were conducted. For self-acceptance, BJW only interacts 
with representation at the level of third parties [Mhigh BJW=3.453 VS . MIOW BJW=3.780; 
F ( l , 298)=5.518,/7<.05], and no interactive effect was found at the level of actors 
[Mhigh BJW=3.836 VS. Miow BJW=3.714; F(1, 298)=.786, p>AO]. That means only third 
parties showed difference in self-acceptance. Third parties felt higher self-acceptance 
than actors when they are weak believers in a just world. The difference disappeared 
when it comes to actors. 
- 5 5 -




I I I 
high BJW low BJW 
actors third parties 
Figure 4. Two-way interaction between representation and BJW, for self-acceptance. 
Three-way interaction 
Three-way interactional effect of representation, opinion and BJW was found 
significant for self-acceptance [F{2, 297)=3.326,/?<.05]. The graphical representation 
of this interaction is provided in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Three-way interactional effect of representation, BJW and opinion, for self-acceptance. 
Simple main effect analyses were conducted afterwards to examine the sources of the 
effects. The two-way interactional effect between BJW and representation (third 
parties) was significant when no opinion was provided [F( l , 298)=12.967, p<.01], and 
this effect was not present when either fair opinion or not fair opinion were provided 
[for not fair opinion, F ( l , 298)=.367, ns; for fair opinion, F ( l , 298)=.843, ns]. When 
provided with no opinions of others, third parties with lower BJW felt higher 
self-acceptance than those with higher BJW. No interactional effects were significant 
for actors. 
We examined Figures 1, 2, and 4 together and found complementary patterns. 
Specifically speaking, when "actors" interact with BJW on procedural justice and 
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interactional justice (general), this interactional effect was not significant for 
self-acceptance. Similarly, "third parties" interact with BJW on self-acceptance, but 
this interactional effect was not significant for procedural justice and interactional 
justice (general). Thus, hypothesis 3 that people's strategies to maintain their belief in 
a just world are exclusive, rather than cumulative, was supported. 
4. Conclusions and implications 
This study aimed to provide insights into the just world belief theory by examining 
the different reactions to the threat of just world belief between actors and third 
parties, as well as by testing whether different strategies can co-occur or not. Our 
results showed that the belief in a just world has a positive effect on people's justice 
perceptions across different situations. That is, no matter the respondents are assumed 
to be actors or third parties, get different opinions, in positively or disadvantage 
situations, generally, they would report similar levels of procedural justice and 
interactional justice (general). 
Further investigation revealed that this relationship is subject to the moderation effect 
of representation. Specifically, when people are actors, the higher their belief in a just 
world, the higher their justice perceptions; the difference disappeared when people are 
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third parties. When this result is interpreted jointly with the finding that interactional 
effect of representation and belief in a just world on self-acceptance is only significant 
at the level of third parties rather than actors, our prediction was supported that 
people's strategies to maintain their belief in a just world are exclusive, rather than 
cumulative. In addition, as predicted, people's interactional justice perceptions are 
influenced by others' opinions. 
First of all, it is important to note that actors and third parties did react differently to 
the threats to their belief in a just world but the patterns were not the as expected. 
According to the results we found, only actors' belief in a just world is positively 
related to their procedural and interactional (general) justice. Third parties' belief in a 
just world was found to be unrelated to their justice perceptions. 
As for the pattern for actors, it is very interesting to find that people high in belief in a 
just world rated higher procedural justice and interactional (general) justice and this 
relationship was not moderated by the dis/ad situation. That is to say, no matter in 
advantage situations or in disadvantage situations, no matter the salary was higher or 
lower than they deserved, people high in BJW felt higher procedural and interactional 
(general) justice. This result has provided support for the justice motive of the need to 
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believe in a just world, rather than the 'rational' or 'mean' motive to maximize 
self-interest, the perspective of which has been held by many researchers. 
The self-interest model asserts that people form justice perceptions to the degree that 
their own interests are satisfied or maximized. Equity theory (Adam, 1965), based on 
that assumption, claimed that people calculate the ratio of output and input to judge 
whether the outcome is allocated fairly. With this perspective, even if employers 
allocate fairly, their motivation may not be derived from being fair itself. Rather, they 
may want to benefit themselves by the increasing cooperation and efficiency of the 
working people through the fair allocation. In addition to the outcome of allocation, 
the procedures of allocation were initially colored with this instrumental assumption. 
Procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) argued that fair procedures helped 
guarantee people's control over the allocation and increased the predictability of 
allocation, so that if the allocation procedure is fair, that also increases the justice 
perceptions. The final objective of procedural justice is still to better control their 
personal outcomes (Mikula, 1984; Reis, 1984). Some researchers also hold the 
opinion that even when a person gives up some current interests, it only implies a 
delay of gratification and the ultimate aim is to gain more long-term benefits. 
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Lemer (2003) pointed out that the argument above had big limitation because "the 
vast majority of the research published over the past 25 years reported that their 
participants employed justice principles to gain other commonly desired 
resources—money, power, status—and the participants ignored or distorted those 
principles when it was to their profit to do so". Based on this conclusion, Lemer (2003) 
suggested that people's pure desire for justice is distinct from self-interest and is of 
great significance. The current research found that actors, high in belief in a just world, 
rated higher in both procedural justice and interactional (general) justice, no matter 
they encountered positively or disadvantage situations. If the justice motive is purely 
for maximizing people's self-interest, this cannot be explained, since according to this 
model, people should rated lower when they were confronted with a disadvantage 
situation. Thus, the current study offered support to Lemer's argument of the 
existence of pure justice motive. 
Secondly, as to the patterns that third parties' belief in a just world isn't related to 
neither procedural justice nor interactional justice (general), this indirectly can be 
explained by the argument below. In the current study, the co-occurrence of strategies 
in maintain in a just world has been examined. As predicted, people are inclined to 
adopt only one, rather than several, strategy if it works. As we argued, cognitive 
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resources of human beings are limited and cognitive work has to be done if people 
need to focus their attention on other things, either by distortion or reinterpretation. It 
would cost more cognitive work if people use several strategies rather than one at the 
same time. Thus, when people's belief in a just world is threatened, they will adopt a 
strategy, which they believe is useful and convenient, to restore the justice and 
maintain their belief. If one strategy works well and is effective enough to overcome 
the aversive emotion brought by the threat to their belief in a just world, it will cost 
less cognitive work for human beings. In this way, people prefer one strategy rather 
than the use of multiple strategies. 
It is generally contradictory to our common sense that people would do anything they 
could in order to solve a problem or cope with some difficulties. This is based on the 
key assumption that people have unlimited resources, either material or cognitive, to 
approach and use. However, this is not the case for human beings. In our case, in 
order to deal with the threat to people's belief in a just world, people have to engage 
much cognitive work and occupies a portion of limited cognitive capacity (Solso, 
1988)，which may in turn limits our choice of strategies to deal with that threat. Thus, 
in the ideal case, if all strategies raised by Lerner and Miller (1978) are adopted to 
restore justice, it would be most effective, given infinite cognitive resources. 
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Nonetheless, now that we know it is not the real case, we understand that we may use 
strategies exclusively, rather than cumulatively. 
Thirdly, it is interesting to see the findings that third parties' information may not 
influence people's perceptions in the way predicted by previous studies. Past research 
argued and found that people would be biased towards other people's opinions when 
they make some evaluations (for example, Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, and Corkran, 
1979). That is to say, opinions from other people may confirm one's own judgments 
or give some information based on which a person form his or her perceptions. In 
addition, some researchers, based on the projection theory, argued that when people 
are confronted with others' opinions, they evaluate the similarity between them and 
the "others". If they think they are similar to the "others", they are willing to accept 
others' opinions. Otherwise, others' opinions will not be considered. These kinds of 
studies added to previous findings and suggested that given the dissimilarity, others' 
opinions might not have any effect on people's perception formation. In addition to all 
this research, this present study found that the opinions of others may have contrary 
effects on one's own judgments. That is, if others think that the event is fair (not fair), 
people may think in the opposite way that the event is not fair (fair). As argued by the 
projection theory above, when people found others' opinions are dissimilar to theirs, 
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they would attribute it to the dissimilarity between them and others. People may not 
be willing to be influenced by people who are totally different from them and thus 
they will not take others' opinion into account. In our case, such an "ignorant" effect 
goes even extreme. Since different people usually think in different way, we may 
speculate in a reversed sequence that when people perceive others, who give their 
opinions, as very different from them, they would deliberately think in a way which is 
different from others. 
Insights into the issue of other people's influence can also be inspired through another 
stream of research, reactance theory, which argued that third parties' information may 
also elicit people's reactance of accepting others' opinions (Brehm, 1966). The 
prerequisite of the reactance is that the people in focus dislike or hate those third 
parties who gave their opinions. That means, if I dislike or hate somebody and I know 
his or her opinion on an issue is toward one direction, I will act or think in the 
opposite direction. Using this perspective to examine the results we get in Figure 3，it 
becomes understandable that why people's justice perceptions are higher (lower) 
when they know other people think it is not fair (fair). 
However, it is still unknown for the pattern for the "no opinions" conditions. As 
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showed in the Figure 3，rather than position between the "fair" and "not fair" 
conditions, weak believers in a just world perceive higher justice perceptions and 
strong believers in a just world perceive lower justice perceptions than "fair" and "not 
fair" conditions. It is against our expectations for the control groups. Some studies on 
employee silence may shed some light on our understanding on this unexpected 
pattern. That is, do "no opinions" really mean no opinions? As introduced by 
Morrison and Mi Hi ken (2000), silence may also mean people's choice to "withhold 
their opinions and concerns about organizational problems". If we look at the issue 
with this perspective, the "no opinions" condition may not be necessarily the control 
condition in the current study, since silence still offers some hints or clues of people's 
attitudes. However, when looking closer in my research design, this argument does 
not hold. The manipulation of the condition "no opinions" is not the same with 
"silence" which people are told their friends kept silent. Rather, no information was 
given on other people's opinions, including whether other people keep silent on the 
issue or not. The concern for the effect of silence does not apply here. Future studies 
on the effect of others' opinion are needed to make some progress to address this issue 
and test our speculation above. 
Several potential limitations of the present research and some future research 
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directions warrant mention. First of all, although we have found that people choose a 
certain strategy, rather than multiple strategies, to cope with the threat to their own 
belief in a just world, it is still not very clear that how people make their choices, why 
some people prefer a certain strategy and others prefer another. Still based on the 
limitation of cognitive capacity, we may speculate that one principle people use is 
convenience, since the use of the most convenient strategy can at most save their 
cognitive capacity and minimize their cognitive work. Also, the environmental cues 
may also impose some limitations and exert some influence on people's choice of 
strategies. Future research focusing on this issue can make important contributions to 
deepen our understanding on strategies people choose to restore justice. Second, 
future studies may also devote to investigate the issue of multiple strategies and study 
more kinds of strategies, such as cognitive strategies, behavioral strategies at the same 
time, so that to widen the research areas and increase the validity and generalizability 
of related research. Thirdly, now that different results of others' opinions on justice 
perceptions have been found in research, it may be worth of efforts to examine and 
explain the controversial effects of others' opinions on people's perception formation. 
Lastly, more studies in the context of organizational contexts are needed to validate 
the effect of the use of belief in a just world in this context. 
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Appendix: Questionnaire used in this study (Chinese version) based on scenario 1. 
假如你现在得到一家企业的聘用’进入该企业工作。这个企业在新员工的工 













有道理的。”�(for “not fair” opinion)你的朋友觉得议很不公平：“在一样的评分 
标准下，你和那个员工的条件差不多，工资却相差坟么冬，议样太没道理了。” ) 
你自己会怎样看待这个事情呢？ 
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